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Abstract 
In this study we examine the antecedents of small independent software vendor (ISV) decisions to join a 
platform ecosystem. Using data on the history of partnering activities from 1201 ISVs from 1996 to 2004, 
we find that appropriability strategies based on intellectual property rights and the possession of 
downstream complementary capabilities by ISVs are positively related to partnership formation, and ISVs 
use these two mechanisms as substitutes to prevent expropriation by the platform owner. In addition, we 
show that greater competition in downstream product markets between the ISV and the platform owner is 
associated with a lower likelihood of partnership formation, while the platform’s penetration into the 
ISV’s target industries is positively associated with the propensity to partner. The results highlight the 
role of innovation appropriation, downstream complementary capabilities, and collaborative competition 
in the formation of a platform ecosystem. 
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1. Introduction 
“We started from the point that one company cannot be the best in all areas. So the more partners 
that we have to innovate around our technology, the more it will be a win/win situation.” 
“We have to be extremely clear with our partners about what they can expect. One rule is that we 
cannot protect the partner forever -- [we cannot guarantee] that there may not be a time when SAP is 
forced to enter his space.” 
Hening Kagermann, former CEO and Chairman of the Executive Board of SAP 
(Knowledge@Wharton 2006) 
Platform-based competition is becoming increasingly a ubiquitous phenomenon in the information 
economy. The personal computer (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999), personal digital assistant (Boudreau 
2007), and video game console (Zhu and Iansiti 2007) are stylized examples of systems that consist of a 
core technology platform (Boudreau 2007) and the interchangeable complementary applications built 
upon it.1 In the software industry we observe that communities of innovation networks, known as 
ecosystems, have been increasingly employed by platform owners to meet heterogeneous user needs 
(Adomavicius et al. 2007, Evans et al. 2006). Industry leaders nurture their ecosystems by coordinating 
and harnessing the collective power of developers, partners, and others integral to the shared success of 
the community (Adner 2006).  
While platform owners encourage the provision of complementary products in order to take advantage of 
indirect network effects (Rochet and Tirole 2003), there is often a tension between the developers of 
complementary products and the platform owner due to risk the latter may eventually compete in the 
partner’s product market space (Gawer and Henderson 2007). This risk is illustrated by the quote from 
SAP ex-CEO Hening Kagermann above. To the extent that the platform owner may ex post “squeeze” 
complementors, the latter may have less ex ante incentive to join the ecosystem in the first place (Choi 
and Stefanadis 2001, Heeb 2003). Prior research has used analytical models or case studies to investigate 
this issue from the perspective of the platform owner (Farrell and Michael L. Katz 2000, Gawer and 
Henderson 2007). However, as yet there has been no systematic empirical evidence on how the potential 
for platform owner entry conditions independent software vendors’ (ISVs) incentives to participate in 
innovation ecosystems. Acquiring such evidence has important managerial implications, as it will inform 
when ecosystems are most likely to grow and succeed. 
                                                     
1 In this paper we follow Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) in defining a platform as a set of interchangeable IT 
components so that buyers and sellers can benefit from the same technological advance. 
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In this study we try to bridge this gap in evidence by examining how the risks of platform owner entry 
influence ISVs’ decisions to join a platform in a specific setting: the enterprise software industry. 
Specifically, we examine the factors influencing the likelihood an ISV will become certified by SAP as a 
platform-compatible application provider. This setting represents a good place to begin studying this 
phenomenon for two reasons: (1) the SAP ecosystem is large; it includes over 41,000 customers and has 
been characterized by some as its own economy (Pang 2007), and (2) SAP publicly certifies vendors in its 
ecosystem, providing an empirically verifiable metric that we use as our dependent variable. SAP 
certification means that SAP engineers have tested and endorsed that the ISV’s software integrates with 
SAP (SAP 2009). SAP-certified partners are the only ones who are displayed on the SAP ecosystem web 
site and partners prominently trumpet their certification through press releases and on their web sites as a 
means of signaling their compatibility with SAP (BasWare 2005).  
We stress three distinct features of this setting. First, while ISVs have the option to produce software that 
is not certified, certification provides a signal that the software will interoperate with SAP, the largest 
enterprise software vendor. The major benefit to joining the ecosystem is the potential for greater sales 
arising from access to the platform owner’s installed base (Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming). Second, the 
relationship often involves collaboration between competitors, characterized as co-opetition (Hamel et al. 
1989, Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1997). The platform owner and the ISV may provide similar 
functional modules and compete in multiple product markets. Third, the potential for entry into the ISV’s 
market by the platform owner, together with uncontrollable knowledge leakage during the process of 
partnering, brings with it the risk of expropriation of the ISV’s intellectual property (IP) over the course 
of the partnership. These risks will be mitigated by the effectiveness of different appropriation strategies 
such as intellectual property protection and ownership of downstream complementary capabilities (Teece 
1986). These three factors – increased payoffs from access to the platform owner’s installed base, risk of 
entry, and threat of knowledge expropriation – are the main trade-offs to the partnering decision that we 
examine in this study. 
We test our theoretical predictions by assembling a unique data set on the partnership decisions of 1201 
ISVs over 1996 to 2004. Collecting data from a variety of sources, we measure the extent to which ISVs 
are formally protected by intellectual property rights and possess downstream marketing capabilities, the 
extent of SAP’s market penetration into the ISVs’ target industries, and the intensity of potential product 
market competition between SAP and the ISVs. Using both discrete time hazard and fixed effects 
regression models, we find that small ISVs utilize both intellectual property rights protection and 
downstream capabilities to prevent expropriation. In particular, we find that ISVs with greater stocks of 
copyrights or those with strong downstream marketing capabilities are more inclined to join the 
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ecosystem. Interestingly, the two appropriation mechanisms serve as substitutes to each other and the 
presence of one weakens the marginal effect of the other on the likelihood of partnering. In addition, we 
find that the incentive of ISVs to join an ecosystem is positively influenced by the penetration of 
complementary SAP products (specifically, ERP) in the ISV’s target industries, reinforcing the view that 
ISVs partner with the platform owner to gain access to its large installed base. Finally, we find evidence 
that ISVs’ decisions to join a platform are strongly influenced by the extent of competition between the 
product offerings of the platform owner and the ISV. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section we present an overview of related 
research and discuss our contributions to the literature. In section 3, we introduce the research setting and 
briefly describe SAP’s partnership program with ISVs. Section 4 presents our hypotheses. Section 5 
describes the data and empirical models. We present the results, as well as a set of robustness checks, in 
section 6. In section 7, we discuss the implications of our study and conclude. 
2. Literature Review 
Our paper contributes to three areas of the literature: recent work on technology platforms and 
ecosystems, research on appropriating the returns from innovation, and studies on the enterprise software 
industry. We discuss each of these in turn. 
2.1. Technology Platforms and Two-Sided Markets 
A growing body of research has examined how platform owners can encourage third-party 
complementors to contribute to a platform to stimulate indirect network effects. For example, theory 
research in this literature has examined platform owner decisions to open a platform (Boudreau 2007, 
Eisenmann et al. 2008, Gawer and Cusumano 2002, Gawer and Henderson 2007, Parker and Van Alstyne 
2008, West 2003) and vendors’ strategic responses to open and closed platforms (Lee and Mendelson 
2008, Mantena et al. 2007). Empirical work has sought to measure the value of network effects to end 
users (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996, Gallaugher and Wang 2002, Gandal 1995, Liu et al. 2008, Zhu 
and Iansiti 2009) as well as the effects of increasing openness on competition (Boudreau 2007). 
Most directly related to our own work is research related to the strategies used by a platform owner to 
manage platform stakeholders such as end users and complementors (Gawer and Cusumano 2002, Gawer 
and Henderson 2007, Iansiti and Levien 2004). Of particular concern is the fine line that platform 
sponsors must walk between maximizing profits and leaving sufficient residual profit opportunities to 
encourage complementary innovation. For example, platform sponsors like Microsoft will frequently 
absorb complements (e.g., a web browser) for efficiency gains (Eisenmann et al. 2007) or to avoid double 
marginalization (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie 2007). While such actions can increase ex post returns 
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for the platform owner, they may discourage ex ante platform-specific investments by potential 
complementors. At present, there is little empirical work that shows how threat of potential entry 
conditions complementor decisions to join a platform. This paper takes a first step towards filling this gap 
by examining how appropriability and competition influence the decision to partner.  
2.2. Appropriating the Returns from Innovations 
Profiting from innovative solutions within a platform-based industry such as enterprise software emerges 
as only a special example of the more general set of innovations investigated by Teece (1986). He 
suggests that when an innovation is easily imitated or invented around, profits from an innovation may be 
appropriated by the owners of certain manufacturing, marketing, and a variety of other capabilities 
required to commercialize an innovation. These complementary capabilities are usually specialized to the 
innovation (i.e., they would lose value in alternative uses). They have two associated characteristics: (1) 
they are not easily accessible through the market, since their specificity give rises to significant 
transaction costs (Teece 1986), and (2) they are valuable, rare and difficult to imitate and their ownership 
provides a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991, Rothaermel and Hill 2005, Teece 1992). 
Indeed, from an empirical point of view, ownership and strength of downstream capabilities required to 
commercialize an innovation are some of the most important appropriability mechanisms across a wide 
range of industries (Cohen et al. 2000). 
While a stronger position in specialized complementary capabilities is beneficial to the appropriation 
strategy through product markets, some argue that the possession and strength of intellectual property 
rights is conducive to technology licensing and markets for ideas (Arora et al. 2001, Dechenaux et al. 
2008, Gans and Stern 2003). Recent research has extended this literature to examine how the existence of 
markets for technology influences the licensing strategies and survival of entrepreneurial firms in the 
security software industry (Arora and Nandkumar 2008, Gambardella and Giarratana 2008). Gambardella 
and Giarratana (2008), in particular, find that technology markets in the security software industry thrive 
when product markets are fragmented and technologies have more general application, whereas 
ownership of patents or co-specialized complementary capabilities do not have sizable or significant 
impacts on the hazard rate of licensing. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) show however that when firms of all 
size are considered, whether the effectiveness of patent protection increases licensing propensity depends 
critically on the ownership and strength of downstream complementary capabilities. 
To the best of our knowledge there is relatively little work studying how the ownership of intellectual 
property and downstream capabilities shape the innovation strategies of small firms in markets 
characterized by software platforms such as enterprise software. Our setting allows us to significantly 
extend the extant appropriability and markets for technology literature, in order to take into account of the 
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fundamentally different nature of the cooperative strategies characterizing platform-based industries. 
Since software certification requires the disclosure of sensitive and proprietary knowledge, we show that 
appropriability strategies—including IP protection, ownership of downstream complementary capabilities 
and their interaction—are crucial drivers of the formation of such partnerships. 
2.3. Enterprise Software 
Extant IS research on enterprise software predominantly focuses on the user side of the market. For 
example, recent empirical research on firm-level performance suggests that adoption of enterprise 
systems is associated with improvements to productivity (Aral et al. 2008, Hitt et al. 2002), market value 
(Hendricks et al. 2007, Hitt et al. 2002), profitability (Hendricks et al. 2007) and operational performance 
(Cotteleer and Bendoly 2006, Hitt et al. 2002, McAfee 2002). 
Despite this wealth of work, there has been a paucity of IS research that studies the supply side of 
enterprise systems, and there is less understanding of the economics and dynamics of the provision of 
enterprise software. An exception is Chellapa and Saraf (forthcoming), which investigates the strategic 
considerations behind alliance relationships among enterprise software vendors and how firms’ 
performance is conditioned on their structural position in the alliance network. Our study, in contrast, 
differentiates the roles played by platform owner and complementary application providers, and unifies 
theories on technology platform, innovation appropriation and collaborative competition to provide a 
holistic view of the formation of enterprise software ecosystem.  
3. SAP and Its Ecosystem 
Enterprise software is claimed to be the organizational operating system (Chellappa and Saraf 
forthcoming), which consolidates the diverse information needs of an enterprise’s departments together 
into a single, integrated software program that operates on a shared database (Hitt et al. 2002). We follow 
Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) as defining a platform as a set of interchangeable IT components so that 
buyers and sellers can benefit from the same technological advance. Third-party software vendor 
applications extend the functionality of the platform and add value to adopters.  
ISVs that produce software that communicates with SAP have the option to become certified by SAP and 
become a member of the SAP platform ecosystem. This certification endorses the interoperability 
between the ISV’s software and the SAP platform. The certification process begins with the ISV 
completing an application with the assistance of the local SAP Integration and Certification Center (ICC) 
or SAP partner liaison/manager. The ISV will then go through development, documentation, and testing 
phases to make sure the product is compliant with SAP’s platform specifications. During this time, the 
SAP ICC will assign a consultant to work with the ISV to prepare for certification and conduct/document 
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a certification test. Once the product successfully completes the certification test, a certification logo will 
be issued and the solution will be listed on SAP’s web portal which is accessible by its customers. For 
ISVs, the primary benefit to partnering is to signal software compatibility and to give ISVs access and 
exposure to SAP’s customer base (Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming). Further, partnership gives ISVs 
access to partner-only portals for product, marketing and sales information, sales/marketing assistance, 
and technical support. 
However, such partnerships are not costless for ISVs. Besides the fixed cost of developing a platform-
compliant version of the software solution, certification application fees and yearly membership fees, 
there are considerable appropriability issues for ISVs due to extensive knowledge sharing involved in the 
relationship. Knowledge transferred from the ISV to SAP may, perhaps inadvertently, lower the costs of 
SAP entering into the market with a competing product.  
4. Theory and Hypotheses 
In this section we detail our theory and hypotheses. A simple model, which builds on and extends prior 
work by Gans et al. (2002), appears in the Appendix. Our model describes how the payoffs to partnering 
with a software platform owner are conditioned by factors such as IP protection, downstream capabilities, 
the platform’s market penetration, and the extent of product competition between the platform owner and 
an ISV. Below we describe a set of hypotheses that map to the comparative statics in the model.  
4.1. Intellectual Property Protection 
Inter-firm collaborative relationships that involve a technology component are often characterized by 
extensive knowledge sharing and exchange (Khanna et al. 1998, Mowery et al. 1996). To the extent that 
one party in the alliance relationship is unaware of the other’s knowledge acquisition intentions, or unable 
to define or control the extent of knowledge leakage, inter-firm collaboration may result in the loss of 
core competencies and expropriation of its innovation by collaborators if the transferred knowledge is not 
protected by any appropriation mechanism (Bresser 1988, Heiman and Nickerson 2004).  
Such knowledge transfer is likely to occur in partnerships between an ISV and a software platform owner. 
For example, during the course of certification in the enterprise software industry the ISV may reveal 
sensitive information on its proprietary technology, its codification of business processes or best practices 
that embody industry-specific knowledge, or a particular design interface. A platform owner who acquires 
such knowledge may replicate or invent around the innovations of the ISV, absorb the distinct features of 
the ISV’s application programs into its own software product suite, and compete directly with the ISV by 
invading its product markets.  
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ISVs can employ several mechanisms to protect their inventions, including legal mechanisms (patents, 
copyrights, and trade secrets), first mover advantages, and the ownership of complementary marketing 
and manufacturing capabilities (Cohen et al. 2000). While surveys suggest that the exploitation of first 
mover advantages is the most effective appropriation mechanism in the software industry (Graham et al. 
2009), this mechanism may be less effective among firms who partner. Historically, copyrights have been 
commonly regarded as an effective legal form of protection for computer software (Graham and Mowery 
2003, Graham et al. 2009, Menell 1989); however a series of legal decisions throughout the 1980s and 
1990s has recently strengthened the intellectual property protection afforded by patents, especially for 
“business methods” (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2006, Graham and Mowery 2003, Lerner and Zhu 2007). 
As a result, both patents and copyrights can be used by the ISV to defend its intellectual property 
(Graham et al. 2009). While knowledge leakage may increase the risk of imitation associated with 
partnering, we expect stronger IP protection to decrease the potential loss of revenues arising from a 
platform owner’s market invasion. Therefore, other things equal, increases in IP protection will be 
associated with greater expected payoffs to partnering. We hypothesize 
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1). The better an ISV’s innovations are protected by intellectual property rights, the 
more likely that it will partner with the software platform owner. 
4.2. Downstream Complementary Capabilities 
Since Teece’s (1986) seminal work, strategy research on innovation appropriation has emphasized the 
importance of the ownership of specialized downstream capabilities (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, 
Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel 2008, Gans and Stern 2003, Rothaermel and Hill 2005). ISVs with 
downstream capabilities will be more successful in appropriating returns from their innovations, even 
when potential competitors such as the platform owner successfully enter their product space (Graham et 
al. 2009). For one, in the case of the partnership between ISVs and SAP, strong downstream marketing 
capability will enhance the returns to access to SAP’s large installed base. In particular, the success of 
converting the platform owner’s extant users into an ISV’s customers will depend on downstream 
capabilities such as brand image, downstream marketing, distribution and service capability.  
For similar reasons, the losses from imitation of the ISV’s innovation will be lower in the presence of 
downstream capabilities. An ISV with brand image and marketing capability will be better able to defend 
their market than firms without such capabilities. Further, these capabilities may be difficult to replicate 
by the platform owner. While knowledge embedded in products can be codified by physical, formal or 
formulaic means, knowledge embedded in business practices or downstream service and consulting 
activities is often stored in human’s head and is less susceptible to unintended leakage (Heiman and 
Nickerson 2004). For example, implementation of enterprise software often requires idiosyncratic 
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adaptations to user needs that will be embedded in the implementation and configuration of the software 
products, and related consulting and service activities (Hitt et al. 2002). Such downstream knowledge and 
capabilities are more costly to transfer across firm boundaries (Brown and Duguid 2001, Von Hippel 
1994) and may also act as a barrier to entry. Therefore, we propose 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2). The stronger an ISV’s downstream capabilities, the more likely that it will partner 
with the software platform owner. 
4.3. IP Protection and Downstream Capabilities 
Researchers have examined and recognized the substitution effect among different types of IP strategies 
(Graham and Somaya 2006). For example, filing a patent necessitates information disclosure which 
makes maintaining the secrecy of an innovation difficult; thus, the use of patents and trade secrecy tend to 
be substitutes in IPR protection (Friedman and Landes 1991, Horstmann et al. 1985, Teece 1986). In this 
study we argue that formal IP protection is less crucial to the expected payoff from partnering in the 
presence of strong complementary downstream capabilities. While the exact payoffs and marginal effects 
are described in our model in the Appendix, here we sketch an intuitive argument. As noted in Hypothesis 
1, patents and copyrights reduce the likelihood of knowledge expropriation. However, Hypothesis 2 
suggests that the negative effect of potential knowledge expropriation will be weaker in the presence of 
complementary downstream capabilities. It follows immediately that the benefits of patents and 
copyrights as a means to protect knowledge when partnering (and, consequently the expected payoff to 
partnership) will be weaker in the presence of strong complementary downstream capabilities. Therefore, 
we propose 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3). The impact of an ISV’s IP protection on the likelihood that it will partner with the 
software platform owner is lower when the ISV has strong downstream capabilities. 
4.4. Platform Penetration into the ISVs’ Target Industries 
Despite the risks of IPR expropriation, ISVs will partner with the platform owner to gain access to its 
installed base. Depending upon the software market, ISVs may still be able to market stand-alone 
application programs and make sales even in the absence of association with a platform. However, 
partnership with the platform owner signals compatibility of the ISV’s product with the platform, 
increasing the expected utility of purchasing the ISV’s product for platform customers and thereby 
increasing the ISV’s sales to the platform’s installed base. Thus, the payoff to partnership will be 
increasing in the size of the platform’s installed base. 
Increases in the platform’s installed base will increase the payoff to partnership with the platform owner 
for other reasons if there are significant (direct or indirect) network effects associated with the platform 
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owner’s product. For one, buyers may be willing to pay more for products that are compatible with a 
larger network (Besen and Farrell 1994, Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996, Liu et al. 2008). Further, in 
industries that are characterized by network effects or complementary products, an industry standard often 
emerges (Besen and Farrell 1994, David and Greenstein 1990, Gandal 1995, Metcalfe and Miles 1994). In 
those industries, being associated with the industry standard is critical for the survival and success of 
producers of complementary products that are based on the chosen standard or platform (Suárez and 
Utterback 1995). The ISV’s prediction of which platform will become dominant critically depends on the 
platform’s installed base. Therefore, we propose 
HYPOTHESIS 4 (H4). Greater market penetration by the software platform owner into an ISV’s target 
industries is associated with higher likelihood that the ISV will partner with the software platform owner. 
4.5. Competition Between the Platform Owner and the ISV 
The effect of competition on partnership success is well documented in the strategy literature (Gimeno 
2004). Although competitive collaboration, or co-opetition, could generate mutual benefits and result in a 
win-win situation through sharing complementary resources or acquiring new skills and capabilities by 
organizational learning (Hamel et al. 1989), empirical evidence often suggests the fragility of such inter-
firm relationship between rivals. For example, Kogut (1989) argues that competitive conflicts impair the 
stability of cooperative agreements due to imitation of partners’ technology and competition in the 
downstream market, and cooperative incentives could be offset by industry structural conditions that may 
promote rivalry among the partners.  
In this paper, we examine one facet of competition between the ISV and the platform owner: closeness in 
product market space. Competition between the ISV and the platform owner will be greater when the 
products of the two vendors are more similar. Further, the losses from imitation of the ISV’s product will 
be higher when the two vendors offer more similar products. Since partnering increases the probability of 
imitation by the platform owner, these losses will in expectation be higher with partnering. That is, the 
expected costs from increased competition with the platform owner will be higher under partnering.  
Anticipating these effects, an ISV with a more similar product portfolio to the platform owner will have 
an attenuated incentive to join the ecosystem. Therefore, we propose 
HYPOTHESIS 5 (H5). The greater the similarity of products with the platform owner, the less likely that 
the ISV will partner with the software platform owner. 
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5. Methods and Measures 
5.1. Sample 
We test our theoretical predictions using a longitudinal data set of 1201 ISVs over the period of 1996-
2004. Our sample begins in 1996 since we observe no such partnerships in our sample prior to 1996 
(more details will be provided later in the section of variable definition). 
A study of partnerships within the enterprise software industry based solely on publicly traded firms in 
the COMPUSTAT universe is likely to suffer from a serious selection bias: well-established public 
software firms may have starkly different incentives to form inter-firm linkages from those of privately 
held new ventures or start-ups (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2006, Shan 1990); moreover, the majority of 
ISVs are privately owned. However, collecting comprehensive, reliable information on small, private 
firms over an extended time period is extremely difficult. In this study we use the CorpTech directory of 
technology companies. The dataset has detailed information on 100,000 public and private firms, 
including information on geography, sales and employees, product offerings, industry classification, 
ownership, funding sources and executives.  
CorpTech includes a proprietary classification system that allows the researcher to identify software firms 
and the types of products they offer. Here we provide an overview of our sample construction, further 
details are provided in Data Appendix B. To construct a representative sample of ISVs that are likely to 
form partnerships with SAP, we match the existing SAP partners (retrieved from SAP’s web portal) to 
their corresponding records in the CorpTech data set and examine their product portfolios. Based on this 
comparison, we find that manufacturing software and warehousing/distribution software are the most 
frequently produced by SAP’s partners. We therefore select all U.S. firms that have a primary industry of 
computer software, and use those that produce “warehousing and distribution” or “manufacturing” 
software as our data sample. As we are primarily interested in the drivers of partnership formation for 
small, entrepreneurial software companies, to reduce unobserved heterogeneity across firms we further 
remove established incumbents from our sample. Following prior literature (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 
Puranam et al. 2006), we refine the ISVs to include those established after 1980, with sales less than $500 
million and with fewer than 1000 employees throughout our sampling period. As an additional check, we 
visit the website of each firm (if the company no longer exists, we visit the archival web site 
www.archive.org instead) to confirm that the ISVs indeed produce enterprise software applications, and 
delete those that do not fit the profile. Our final sample consists of 1201 ISVs. 
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5.2. Variable Definition and Operationalization 
5.2.1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is whether an ISV enters into partnership with SAP in a particular year. While one 
approach would be to identify partners listed directly on the SAP platform ecosystem web site, using this 
method we would be unable to identify the timing of partnership events. Instead, we identify partnership 
formation events through press releases by searching the Lexis/Nexis database. To test the viability of this 
approach, we compared the list of partners obtained through this method with a list obtained from the 
SAP web site and found that our method identifies 98% of partners mentioned by SAP.2 
The unit of observation in our data is a firm-year, with the partnership variable equal to 1 if a first-time 
alliance is formed in that year, 0 otherwise. Post-alliance observations are deleted as the firms are no 
longer exposed to the hazard of forming a partnership with SAP. In total, our sample includes 6381 firm-
year observations. The data is structured as an unbalanced panel since there are late entries and exits. 
5.2.2. Independent Variables 
Patents. We generate the ISV patent stock variable by using the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) CASSIS Patents BIB database. While the decision to partner will be influenced by a vendor’s 
stock of software patents, some vendors may have inventions in related areas such as manufacturing 
control or data acquisition equipment. Accordingly, we restrict our patent measure to software patents 
only (however our results are similar if we include both software and non-software patents). To identify 
software patents, prior research has used USPTO class-subclass combinations (Graham and Mowery 
2006, Hall and MacGarvie 2006) while others have used a Boolean query that searches for keywords in 
patent text (Bessen and Hunt 2004). We follow Hall and MacGarvie (2006) in using the intersection of 
these two methods to identify software patents.3 As a robustness check, we also use the union of the 
software patent sets identified by the two methods and derive alternative measures; our empirical results 
are robust to the different measures of patents stock. To account for the heterogeneity in the impact and 
importance of innovation, we use Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg weighted stock of patent grants by incorporating 
forward patent citations (Hall et al. 2001). 
Patent effectiveness. An ISV’s stock of patents is partly determined by its patent propensity, which may 
in turn be influenced by variations in the effectiveness of patent protection in the different sub-segments 
in the software industry in which the ISV participates (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006). To examine whether 
variance in patents does indeed capture sub-segment variation in the strength of patent protection, we 
                                                     
2 Further discussion of our method for identifying partnerships is provided in the Data Appendix. 
3 For a survey of various methods of identifying software patents in USPTO patent data, see Layne-Farrar (2005). 
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construct the variable patent effectiveness obtained from the patent inventor survey jointly conducted by 
Georgia Tech and the Japanese Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).4 The survey 
asks patent inventors to assess the importance of patents in protecting their firm’s competitive advantage 
for the commercial product/process/service based on the patented invention in a 5-point Likert scale. We 
computed averages of the Likert responses at the 5-digit international patent class (IPC) level and linked 
to our data by the corresponding IPC class of the patents owned by ISVs in our sample. The resulting 
firm-level patent effectiveness score represents the average of patent effectiveness scores of all patents 
owned by the focal firm. A similar measure has been frequently used in the literature on innovation and 
appropriability as a summary indicator of the net benefits from patenting (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, 
Cohen et al. 2000, Gans et al. 2002). 
Copyrights. The cumulative number of software copyrights for each firm-year is obtained from the United 
States Copyright Office. We retrieve the complete set of copyrights that are described as “computer files” 
within that office’s classification scheme.  
Downstream capability. One important measure of a firm’s marketing capability is trademarks (Gao and 
Hitt 2005). According to the USPTO, a trademark represents “a word, phrase, symbol or design, or 
combination of words, phrases, symbols or designs that identifies and distinguishes the source of the 
goods or services of one party from those of others.” In this study we use the total number of software 
trademarks as a proxy for downstream marketing capabilities (Fosfuri et al. 2008), and obtain the data 
from the USPTO CASSIS Trademarks BIB database. We use only software trademarks that are currently 
“live” as of the date of observation (further details on the construction of this variable are available in the 
Data Appendix). 
Target industry penetration. In order to construct a valid measure of SAP’s market penetration in the 
ISV’s target industries, we obtain SAP installation data in the United States from Harte-Hanks CI 
Technology Database, and calculate SAP’s penetration rate in the companies of the CI database by each 
industry-year. Harte Hanks surveys over 300,000 establishments in the United States per year on their use 
of information technology; our sample of data from the CI database includes all establishments with over 
                                                     
4 The survey was conducted in 2008 and was directed to the inventors of a random sample of the granted U.S. 
patents filed between 2000 and 2003 and included in the OECD’s Triadic Patent Families, e.g., filed with both the 
Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) and granted in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). More information on the survey can be found in Jung (2009) and Walsh and Nagaoka 
(2009). 
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100 employees.5 We identify the set of firms that have adopted SAP in each year and weight these by the 
number of employees6. We use these data to compute the SAP penetration rate for the industries served 
by the ISVs (details are provided in the Data Appendix).   
Competition. The variety of its product portfolio is indicative of a software firm’s scope of economic 
activity (Cottrell and Nault 2004), and the similarity in product market space between the ISV and SAP 
(and similarly, the intensity of competition) can be measured by how much their application product 
offerings overlap. Product portfolio information is obtained from the CorpTech database. The CorpTech 
database has an internal “2-digit” classification system that indicates the products produced by software 
firms (for example, Software-Accounting and Software-Warehousing/Distribution are examples of “2-
digit” classes). We retrieve the distinct 2-digit product codes for each ISV in each year, and compare 
those with SAP’s 2-digit product portfolio in the same year. 2-digit product codes are used as a proxy for 
product lines because they correspond very well to the functional modules of enterprise software. The 
variable product overlap is defined as the ratio of the number of common product lines (produced by both 
an ISV and SAP) to the number of ISV’s product lines for each firm-year. As a robustness check, we also 
construct alternative measures of product overlap by dividing the number of common product lines by 
number of SAP’s product lines for each firm-year and the results are similar. Note product overlap is a 
time-varying covariate as an ISV may have entered into a related software market segment, introduced 
new software product lines, or exited from certain product markets. 
5.2.3. Control Variables 
We control for various firm level drivers that could influence an ISV’s decision to join the SAP 
ecosystem. Firm size is measured by an ISV’s annual sales, obtained directly from the CorpTech 
database. Firm age is derived by referencing the year that an ISV was established. To allow for nonlinear 
effect of age, we add both linear and quadratic terms of age. We also add an ownership indicator variable 
to allow for different propensities for alliance formation between public and privately held companies. 
The variable public is set to 1 if an ISV is a publicly traded company; 0 otherwise.  
                                                     
5 The CI database has been extensively used in the information systems and economics fields to measure IT 
investment (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003, Dewan et al. 2007), including investment in enterprise software (Hitt et al. 
2002). Prior work has shown that this database is quite representative of the distribution of large establishments (the 
ones most likely to use SAP) in the U.S. economy (Forman et al. 2005). 
6 As software license subscription is usually based on the number of concurrent users (Hitt et al. 2002), we use 
employee-weighted penetration rate instead of sales-weighted. 
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We also include controls for firm funding sources. Software firms’ source of capital is likely to affect 
their decision to form partnership for several reasons. First, software firms backed by corporate 
investment or venture capital are more likely to accumulate social capital that is unavailable to other start-
ups. In addition, bargaining intermediaries such as venture capitalists can reduce the cost of forging a 
contract between the parties and so increase the likelihood of partnership (Colombo et al. 2006, Gans et 
al. 2002). The CorpTech database classifies the funding sources into corporate investment, private 
investment or venture capital investment. We create 3 dummy variables, cinvest, pinvest and vinvest, 
respectively, to control for the effect of firms’ source of funding on alliance formation. 
As a control for ISVs’ innovative capability, we obtain the ISVs’ cumulative number of publications in 
academic journals or conferences in each year via the Web of Science database. To account for the 
importance of publications, we also retrieve forward citation data for all the publications and construct 
citation weighted publications.  
5.3. Model Specification 
We use hazard models to study the decisions of ISVs to partner with SAP. The hazard model (also 
referred to in various literatures as survival, duration or event history model) is appropriate since it 
relaxes normality assumption in most linear regressions and allows corrections for right censoring, 
truncation, late entry, time-varying covariates and duration dependence (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
Hazard analysis models the underlying and unobserved hazard rate, which is the instantaneous rate at 
which hazard events occur at time t, given that the subject under study has survived until time t.  
We chose the Cox proportional hazard model as a starting point for empirical analysis. The Cox 
proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric specification that makes no assumption about the shape of 
the baseline hazard over time, and assumes that covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard 
function. Applying the hazard model to our specification, we have , 0 ,( | ) ( ) exp( ),i i t -1 i t -1h t h tx x β  and 
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Where ,( | )i i t-1h t x  is the conditional instantaneous hazard rate for ISV i in year t, and 0 ( )h t  is the 
unspecified baseline hazard in year t. We lag all independent variables by one year to allow for causal 
interpretation. Note there is no intercept in the Cox model as it is subsumed into the baseline hazard 
function and unidentified. 
15 
 
As an alternative estimation method, we use a (firm) fixed effects linear probability model to study the 
event history (Wooldridge 2001), allowing for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. We follow prior 
literature in using the fixed effects linear probability model to study outcomes with limited dependent 
variables (Forman et al. 2009, Gowrisankaran and Stavins 2004, Miller and Tucker 2009) due to the 
known difficulties of controlling for panel-level unobservables using fixed effects in nonlinear models 
such as the probit or logit.7 In order to estimate the linear probability model, the data are arranged into 
cross-sectional time series format. The unit of observation is a firm-year, and the event is the binary 
decision that an ISV joins the platform ecosystem of SAP. If the event happens for an ISV in a particular 
year, all post-event observations are removed from the sample as we assume partnering is an absorbing 
state. Otherwise the observation for the ISV is right censored (event does not occur during the sampling 
years) and all years of data are included. 
6. Results 
6.1. Findings 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables and controls, as well as the correlation matrix. The 
descriptive statistics indicate that ISVs are characterized by significant heterogeneity along key 
dimensions, such as ownership of IPRs (copyrights range from 0 to 498), downstream capability 
(trademarks range from 0 to 23), SAP penetration (ranges from 0% to 93%), and product portfolio 
overlap (ranges from 0% to 100%). It is worth noting that patents are far less frequently used by start-up 
ISVs in the enterprise software industry (with mean of .14 patent per firm) than copyrights (mean 2.03 per 
firm), consistent with prior literature suggesting that copyrights remain an important source of IP 
protection for enterprise software since most innovations are in business processes, routines and best 
practices that may not be amenable to patenting (Mann and Sager 2007, Menell 1989). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Results from Cox proportional hazard survival models are presented in Table 2. In all regressions we use 
the log transformation of patents, patent effectiveness, copyrights, trademarks and sales (that is, log(1+x) 
to avoid taking log of zeros except for patent effectiveness, which is strictly positive) to control for over 
dispersion and skewness in these variables. Variables are entered into the regression sequentially with the 
log likelihood reported for each model. Column 1 presents the baseline model where only variables for IP 
                                                     
7 For a full discussion of these issues, see Wooldridge (2001). Unconditional fixed effects provide inconsistent 
estimates using probit or logit models because of the well-known incidental parameters problem. Further, 
conditional fixed effects models drop panels where there is no variation in the dependent variable—in our setting, 
this would include any ISV that does not eventually become a partner. 
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protection, downstream capabilities and publications are included. In column 2 we add interactions 
between IP protection and downstream capability. Column 3 includes the measurement of SAP’s 
penetration rate in the ISV’s target industries, as well as product portfolio overlap between SAP and ISVs. 
We add the full set of control variables in Column 4. Finally, in column 5 we add patent effectiveness to 
control for potential differences in patent propensities among firms.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Examining the results of the final model, we find support for H1. Increases in the stock of copyrights are 
positively associated with an ISV’s hazard of partnering with SAP, indicating that copyrights are an 
important mechanism employed by ISVs to prevent knowledge expropriation. Although the stock of 
patents is not found to be significantly related to the decision of an ISV to join the partnership, we do find 
evidence that the effectiveness of patent protection increases an ISVs’ propensity to partner. This is not 
surprising since the stock of patents granted to a particular firm is driven by multiple factors such as 
patent propensity (itself driven by patent strength), technological opportunities, and R&D productivity 
(Griliches 1990). Patent effectiveness is a more direct, albeit survey-based, measure of the strength of 
patent protection. ISVs with few or no patents should have a low propensity to patent because this legal 
mechanism may not be effective for appropriating innovation rents. However, our theory implies that 
firms with stronger patents are expected to enforce their patents with a greater probability of success. 
Consistent with expectations, we find that ISVs holding patents in technological sub-classes where patent 
protection is considered more effective have greater incentives to partner due to greater abilities to 
safeguard themselves against the potential imitation by the platform owner. The results clearly show that 
the effect of patents is significantly reduced when patent effectiveness is included, suggesting that this 
variable is indeed capturing, albeit imperfectly, variations in the underlying strength of patent protection 
within segments of the enterprise software industry. We also find a strong positive effect of trademark 
stock on the partnership formation across specification and models, confirming hypothesis H2. Consistent 
with our expectation, we also find evidence that IP protection and downstream capabilities act as 
substitutes for one other in their influence on partnership formation, and the effect is more pronounced for 
copyrights than for patents, partially confirming H3.  
A numerical example would illustrate the main effects and interaction effects of IPR protection and 
trademarks. To examine the marginal effects, we consider a log transformed variables xi in the Cox 
proportional hazard model. Suppose we increase xi by 100%, while holding other variables constant, the 
hazard ratio is 
( | 2 , ) exp[ ln(2 )] exp( ln 2) 2
( | , ) exp( ln )
ii i i
i
i i i
h t x x
h t x x
   
-i
-i
x
x  
17 
 
For example, if the effectiveness of patent protection is doubled while everything else remains 
unchanged, the likelihood of partnering with SAP will be increased by 21.826-1=255%. 
Now consider a firm that has the mean value of log transformed copyright (.378, correspond to 
copyright=.46) and the mean value of log transformed trademarks (.333, correspond to trademark=.40). If 
the firm doubles its stock of copyrights while holding other variables constant, the hazard ratio becomes
[.663 ( .571) .333] .4732 2 1.388     , which means a 39% increase in the hazard. Similarly, if the firm doubles its 
stock of trademarks while holding other conditions unchanged, the hazard ratio becomes
[.929 ( .571) .378] .7132 2 1.639     , which translates into a 64% increase in the hazard rate. However, if the firm 
doubles both its copyrights and trademarks, the hazard ratio becomes 
1 2 1,2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2
1 2 1,2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2
2
1 2 3 1 2
.663 .929 2
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which implies a 73% increase in the hazard rate. This is considerably lower than the combination of the 
direct effect of copyrights and the direct effect of trademarks, 1.388×1.639-1=127% increase, due to the 
substitution effect (negative interaction) between copyrights and trademarks.  
Hypothesis H4 suggests that as SAP’s penetration into an ISV’s target industries increases, the ISV is 
more inclined to partner with SAP. This hypothesis is confirmed by our empirical results. A one percent 
increase in SAP’s penetration into ISV’s industries is associated with a exp(.01 (2.790)) 1 2.83%    
increase in the likelihood of partnering. 
Hypothesis H5 states that the higher product portfolio overlap with SAP that an ISV has, the less likely 
that the ISV will join the SAP’s platform ecosystem. We find that hypothesis H5 is supported. As an 
ISV’s product overlap with SAP increases by 1%, its likelihood of partnering with SAP decreases by 
1 exp(.01 ( .97)) .96%    . 
Among the controls, the results suggest the funding sources of ISVs do influence their inter-firm linkage 
activities. Consistent with prior literature, ISVs that are backed up by venture capital are more inclined to 
partner with SAP, due to their greater access to social capital, stronger bargaining power and lower 
contract cost. In contrast, ISVs funded by private investment are less likely to access those resources, and 
therefore have lower chance of partnering with SAP. 
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6.2. Tests for Robustness 
Although survival analysis is suitable for modeling event history and our specification of Cox 
proportional hazard model does not impose restrictions on the baseline hazard function, there are two 
possible concerns associated with our prior analyses. First, there might be firm-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity that is correlated with the dependent variable which could lead to inconsistent estimates. 
For example, better managed or more innovative firms could both have more copyrights and trademarks 
and also be more likely to partner. Second, our measurements of IP protection using patents and 
copyrights stocks may be correlated with unobserved drivers of a firm’s innovative capability and 
propensity for adopting formal IP protection strategies. Using a fixed effects model could effectively 
remove any bias caused by any source of time-invariant unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.  
Table 3 presents the results of estimating a standard fixed effects (‘within firm’) model. Comparing the 
results with those of Table 2, we actually find stronger support for Hypothesis 1, as a significant positive 
effect is identified for patent stocks after controlling for time-invariant innovation capabilities and patent 
propensities. We also observe that the positive effect of patents is mainly driven by the strength of patent 
protection. Indeed, when patent effectiveness is added to the model, the patent stock itself becomes 
insignificant. Hypotheses 2 and 3 also hold as before.  
While the results for all of our variables measuring IP appropriation are robust to the use of fixed effects, 
estimates for the effects of penetration and product overlap are weaker. We speculate that this result is 
driven by the fact that variation in these measures are primarily cross-sectional, while fixed effects 
models only utilize the within-firm, longitudinal variation to perform the estimation. As it is well known, 
this can lead to significant loss of efficiency in estimation (Greene 2002). Indeed, a between-firm panel 
estimation using cross-sectional variations confirms our conjecture and demonstrates a much stronger and 
significant effect of penetration and product overlap (between estimation results are available upon 
request).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We further explore the robustness of our findings through several alternative models and measurements of 
the independent variables. In column 1 of Table 4 we present results of our baseline Cox hazard model 
using raw counts of stocks of patents and scientific publications that are unweighted by forward citations. 
While the measurement of product overlap is normalized by ISVs’ product portfolios in Table 2 and 3, the 
variable may not capture the extent to which SAP perceives the ISV as a competitor. We replace the 
variable by normalizing it using SAP’s product portfolio and present the results in Column 2 of Table 4. 
In both cases we find the set of results is similar to those in Table 2.  
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Although Cox hazard model has been commonly used in the literature because of its flexibility, the 
estimates are not always efficient when compared with full parametric models, if the underlining baseline 
hazard function is known (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). In column 3 of Table 4 we present the results 
from the most commonly used parametric model, the exponential hazard model. Similar results are found 
as in the Cox proportional hazard model. We also extend the exponential model to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity, as there could be potential omitted variables that influence alliance formation 
and which are correlated with the independent variables. Empirically this amounts to the inclusion of a 
multiplicative idiosyncratic factor, known as a frailty, to the hazard function specification (Bruce et al. 
2004, Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The unobserved heterogeneity is usually assumed to be gamma or 
inverse-Gaussian distributed. We present the results of an exponential hazard model with inverse-
Gaussian frailty in column 4 of Table 4. The likelihood ratio test for heterogeneity does not reject the null 
of no heterogeneity (p=.304), indicating that our set of explanatory variables is sufficiently inclusive. The 
different models listed in Table 4 provide further evidence of the robustness of our results.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1. Summary of Results and Managerial Implications 
Innovation ecosystems have long existed in the computer software industry. Surprisingly, there has been a 
paucity of empirical studies that examine the incentives and antecedents of the formation of such 
ecosystems from the perspective of its participants. Our study uses a simple model to illustrate the 
facilitators of and barriers to an ISV’s partnering with a platform owner in the enterprise software 
industry. We present robust empirical evidence that ISVs with better legal protections through intellectual 
property rights and those with stronger downstream marketing capabilities are more likely to partner. 
Interestingly, protection of upstream capabilities using formal IPRs and downstream appropriation 
protection through marketing capabilities substitute for each other in shaping the payoff to partnering. 
Increases in the size of the platform owner’s installed base also increase the payoff to partnering. Further, 
when the ISV and the platform owner compete in similar markets, the risks of platform owner entry 
discourages such partnership. 
We envision several broad implications of our empirical findings for platform sponsors as well as 
participants in the platform ecosystem. First, while certification from a major platform owner may 
provide the ISV with a larger market access, endorsement effect and enhance its social and technical 
legitimacy (Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming), the ISV may bear considerable knowledge expropriation 
risks during the process if both IP protection is weak and if the ISV does not possess strong downstream 
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capabilities. In addition, ISVs that compete with the platform owner in multiple product markets should 
be cautious about proceeding with such a partnership. Finally, for a platform owner that focuses on 
fostering the rapid growth of its ecosystem to capture the indirect network effect and promoting the 
platform as de facto industry standard, understanding the incentives and reservations of its 
complementary product providers is of paramount importance, and building proper governance 
mechanisms that alleviates its partners’ expropriation concerns could be conducive to the shared success 
of the community (Gawer and Henderson 2007). Surprisingly, our findings suggest that a strong, well-
functioning IPR regime not only protects complementors from expropriation risks, but also work to the 
benefit of platform owner in that it encourages the provision of complementary innovation that is based 
on the platform. 
Our results also have implications for where ecosystems are most likely to arise. Ecosystems will be less 
likely to arise among firms with little formal means of IPR protection and, in particular, will be less likely 
where the protection afforded by patents is weak. They will be relatively more common when 
complementors are more effectively able to secure their innovations through copyrights, patents, and 
downstream capabilities, and when the products of platform owner and complementor do not directly 
compete. 
Although our research is set in the enterprise software industry, we note that the implications could be 
applied to more general contexts which involve the relationship between a technology platform and 
complementary application provision. For example, in the media player software market, WINAMP was 
among the first to release Windows-based mp3 players, and RealPlayer was the first Windows-based 
media player capable of streaming media over the Internet. However, with their innovation unprotected, 
Microsoft eventually invaded their product space with its introduction of built-in Windows Media Player, 
and squeezed both into oblivion. In contrast, Windows-based iTunes, released by Apple at a later stage, 
enjoyed great success, largely due to Apple’s ownership of downstream complementary capabilities: a 
dominant position in content provision and a large, loyal customer base of its mobile media player, iPod.  
7.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Although patents and copyrights appear as effective measures of IP protection, we acknowledge our 
limited ability to disentangle the effects of innovation from IPR protection on partnership formation, as 
firms in different industry segments may face different levels of strength of legal IPR mechanisms and 
have different propensities for employing patents, copyrights, trade secrecy, lead time advantage and 
other informal innovation protection alternatives (Cohen et al. 2000). For example, prior studies have 
documented that the patent propensity rate varies dramatically across industries, with firms in textiles on 
average patenting less than 10% of their innovations while pharmaceutical firms have a patent rate of 
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more than 80% (Arundel and Kabla 1998; Cohen et al. 2000). Although firms in the industry of interest in 
this study, enterprise software, are relatively homogeneous, it is possible that patent and copyright 
propensity varies according to firm size (Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999), relative effectiveness of patents 
and copyrights within software submarkets (Arora et al. 2008, Mann and Sager 2007), or characteristics 
of the technology (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). We address this issue by including scientific publications of 
ISVs as a measure of (unprotected) innovation, by using fixed effects models to remove time-invariant 
factors that may contribute to patent filing, and by explicitly controlling for the strength of patent 
protection using a survey-based measure.  
Another limitation of this study is that we focus on the dyadic relationship between an ISV and the 
platform owner, while theory and research have advanced to analyze conduct and performance of firms 
by examining the network relationships in which they are embedded (Bae and Martin 2004, Goerzen and 
Beamish 2005). In cases that multiple platforms and standards coexist in certain industries, firms face 
substitutable alliance partners from which they can draw complementary resources from (Bae and Martin 
2004). Particularly in enterprise software, studies of what determines small ISVs to choose or join 
different platforms sponsored by dominant incumbents such as SAP or Oracle, and how firm 
performances are conditioned on their structural positions inside the partnership network would provide a 
much richer understanding of the ecosystem evolution than treating the partnership decision as binary 
choices. 
There is plenty of room for further research on the topic of ecosystem of enterprise software. Particularly, 
it is unclear through what mechanisms the partnering ISVs extract relational rent from such inter-firm 
exchange and how their post-partnership financial performance and exit strategies differ from non-
participants. In addition, the roles of other ecosystem constituents such as customers, implementation 
partners and consulting companies remain largely unexplored and call for further investigation. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Partneri,t 0.006 0.078 0 1 1.000
2 Patentsi,t-1 0.138 0.682 0 13 0.028 1.000
3 Patent effectivenessi,t-1 1.028 0.239 1 5 0.047 0.472 1.000
4 Copyrightsi,t-1 2.031 13.187 0 498 0.010 0.009 0.003 1.000
5 Trademarksi,t-1 0.806 2.009 0 23 0.061 0.334 0.126 0.279 1.000
6 SAP penetrationi,t-1 0.226 0.153 0 0.932 0.023 0.092 0.027 0.007 0.089 1.000 
7 Product overlapi,t-1 0.418 0.327 0 1 -0.026 -0.046 -0.024 -0.014 -0.073 -0.115 1.000
8 Agei,t-1  12.947 5.680 0 24 -0.049 -0.111 -0.096 0.069 0.005 0.045 0.022 1.000
9 Salesi,t-1 (millions) 6.967 13.980 0 169 0.077 0.213 0.124 0.292 0.356 0.032 -0.032 -0.044 1.000
10 Publici,t-1 0.058 0.233 0 1 0.032 0.227 0.122 0.062 0.213 0.022 -0.031 -0.047 0.403 1.000
11 Cinvesti,t-1 0.041 0.198 0 1 0.014 0.042 0.003 -0.021 0.045 0.023 0.015 -0.115 0.113 0.054 1.000
12 Pinvesti,t-1 0.520 0.500 0 1 -0.037 -0.042 -0.039 -0.011 -0.050 0.024 0.029 -0.146 -0.095 -0.027 -0.061 1.000
13 Vinvesti,t-1  0.114 0.318 0 1 0.079 0.121 0.071 -0.008 0.104 0.109 0.017 -0.332 0.152 0.138 0.073 -0.070 1.000
14 Publicationi,t-1 0.616 5.532 0 137 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.032 0.039 0.005 0.045 0.052 0.079 -0.015 -0.018 0.040 1.000
 
Notes. Number of firms: 1201; Number of observations: 6381. 
 
 
23 
 
Table 2 Survival Analysis, Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Patent 0.158 0.279* 0.226 0.124 -0.0217 
 (0.104) (0.153) (0.157) (0.169) (0.204) 
Patent effectiveness     1.826* 
     (1.103) 
Copyrights 0.142 0.569*** 0.607*** 0.658*** 0.663*** 
 (0.156) (0.208) (0.212) (0.219) (0.219) 
Trademarks 0.803*** 1.276*** 1.205*** 0.922*** 0.929*** 
 (0.213) (0.256) (0.257) (0.294) (0.292) 
Patents × Trademarks  -0.121 -0.107 -0.0755 -0.0463 
  (0.0997) (0.0992) (0.109) (0.110) 
Copyrights × Trademarks  -0.465** -0.485** -0.567*** -0.571*** 
  (0.200) (0.200) (0.211) (0.208) 
SAP penetration   3.417*** 2.709** 2.790** 
   (1.212) (1.322) (1.342) 
Multiple industry   0.880** 0.825** 0.832** 
   (0.393) (0.384) (0.386) 
Product overlap   -0.601 -0.941* -0.970* 
   (0.531) (0.547) (0.550) 
Public    -0.595 -0.570 
    (0.540) (0.539) 
Age    -0.106 -0.110 
    (0.119) (0.120) 
Age2    0.00245 0.00259 
    (0.00539) (0.00539) 
Sales    0.650*** 0.648*** 
    (0.174) (0.172) 
Corporate invest    0.110 0.111 
    (0.627) (0.627) 
Private invest    -0.702* -0.731* 
    (0.373) (0.375) 
VC invest    0.945** 0.924** 
    (0.374) (0.376) 
Publication 0.259 0.157 0.111 0.140 0.173 
 (0.327) (0.341) (0.367) (0.384) (0.379) 
No. of firms 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 
Observations 6381 6381 6381 6381 6381 
Log likelihood -250.99388 -247.01567 -240.66373 -221.04926 -219.83565 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.  
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Table 3 Linear Probability Model, Fixed Effects Estimation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Patents 0.00859*** 0.00910*** 0.00872*** 0.00717** 0.00485 
 (0.00295) (0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00335) (0.00350) 
Patent effectiveness     0.0291** 
     (0.0129) 
Copyrights 0.0120*** 0.0199*** 0.0197*** 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00503) (0.00503) (0.00505) (0.00504) 
Trademarks 0.00620* 0.0118*** 0.0115*** 0.0102** 0.0104*** 
 (0.00322) (0.00392) (0.00393) (0.00399) (0.00399) 
Patents × Trademarks  -0.000771 -0.000748 -0.00165 -0.000822 
  (0.00177) (0.00177) (0.00178) (0.00181) 
Copyrights × Trademarks  -0.00675*** -0.00660*** -0.00608** -0.00645** 
  (0.00254) (0.00254) (0.00255) (0.00255) 
SAP penetration   0.0149 0.0145 0.0149 
   (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
Multiple industry    -- -- -- 
      
Product overlap    0.0118 0.0106 0.0103 
   (0.00738) (0.00749) (0.00748) 
Public    0.0506*** 0.0499*** 
    (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Age    0.00323* 0.00337** 
    (0.00167) (0.00167) 
Age2    -9.09e-05** -9.45e-05** 
    (4.27e-05) (4.27e-05) 
Sales    -0.000844 -0.000648 
    (0.00266) (0.00266) 
Corporate invest    -0.0167 -0.0149 
    (0.0131) (0.0131) 
Private invest    -0.00249 -0.00255 
    (0.00638) (0.00638) 
VC invest    0.00228 0.00335 
    (0.00994) (0.00994) 
Publication 0.0242*** 0.0235*** 0.0234** 0.0244*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.00910) (0.00910) (0.00910) (0.00918) (0.00918) 
Constant 0.00501 0.00158 -0.00835 -0.0317 -0.0531** 
 (0.00350) (0.00372) (0.00671) (0.0240) (0.0258) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
No. of firms 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 
Observations 6381 6381 6381 6381 6381 
R2 (with fixed effects) 0.5018 0.5026 0.5029 0.5052 0.5057 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.  
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Table 4 Alternative Measures and Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Alternative measure 
of patent and 
publications 
(unweighted) 
Alternative measure 
of product overlap 
(normalized by SAP)
Exponential hazard 
model 
Exponential hazard 
with unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Patents 0.0549 0.119 0.103 0.113 
 (0.666) (0.171) (0.169) (0.183) 
Copyrights 0.660*** 0.683*** 0.693*** 0.764*** 
 (0.221) (0.222) (0.216) (0.283) 
Trademarks 0.925*** 0.909*** 0.903*** 0.987*** 
 (0.289) (0.296) (0.297) (0.352) 
Patents × Trademarks -0.156 -0.0812 -0.0892 -0.101 
 (0.403) (0.109) (0.109) (0.124) 
Copyrights × Trademarks -0.570*** -0.567*** -0.619*** -0.654*** 
 (0.210) (0.211) (0.215) (0.245) 
SAP penetration 2.778** 2.638** 1.983* 2.191* 
 (1.319) (1.329) (1.135) (1.297) 
Multiple industry  0.841** 0.807** 0.748** 0.800** 
 (0.383) (0.384) (0.368) (0.406) 
Product overlap  -0.900* -2.323** -1.002* -1.088* 
 (0.546) (0.975) (0.534) (0.602) 
Public -0.541 -0.530 -0.538 -0.540 
 (0.527) (0.543) (0.537) (0.616) 
Age -0.118 -0.0989 -0.163 -0.167 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.114) (0.125) 
Age2 0.00270 0.00216 0.00358 0.00331 
 (0.00539) (0.00545) (0.00502) (0.00559) 
Sales 0.632*** 0.683*** 0.634*** 0.673*** 
 (0.173) (0.177) (0.173) (0.198) 
Corporate invest 0.140 0.0565 -0.0134 0.0136 
 (0.626) (0.628) (0.631) (0.707) 
Private invest -0.749** -0.717* -0.773** -0.830** 
 (0.375) (0.374) (0.375) (0.411) 
VC invest 0.903** 0.926** 0.876** 0.902** 
 (0.371) (0.373) (0.381) (0.417) 
Publication 0.225 0.138 0.140 0.142 
 (0.255) (0.379) (0.371) (0.421) 
Constant   -6.360*** -6.455*** 
   (0.874) (0.955) 
No. of firms 1201 1201 1201 1201 
Observations 6381 6381 6381 6381 
Log likelihood -220.90356 -219.36468 -157.44985 -157.31881 
 
Notes.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
       *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.  
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Appendix A. Partnering to Achieve Platform Compatibility: A Simple Model 
We present a simple multi-stage game to formalize the payoff structure related to an ISV’s decision to 
join a platform ecosystem and to motivate our hypotheses. The model is adapted from Gans et al. (2002) 
and involves a start-up ISV and a platform owner. The ISV is endowed with an invention and embeds the 
invention into a software product. It faces a choice of going to the market alone or forming a partnership 
with the platform owner, and therefore gaining access to a larger market. In order to sell to the platform 
owner’s installed base the ISV must go through the certification process. Let θ be the strength of IPR 
protection for the ISV. That is, in case the invention is imitated or invented around by a competitor, the 
ISV has probability θ of enforcing its IPR successfully (that is, deterring entry). Let T denote the ISV’s 
downstream complementary capabilities, C denote the intensity of competition between the platform 
owner and the ISV in the application product market, and P denote the platform owner’s penetration into 
the ISV’s target industries. 
Figure A1 illustrates the sequence of the game. If the ISV goes to market alone (i.e., does not join the 
platform), it enjoys a profit ߨ௘ in a relatively small market. However there is a probability ݌௡ that the 
platform owner imitates its innovation (e.g., by reverse engineering) and enters the ISV’s application 
market. If the ISV is unsuccessful in defending its IPR, the ISV incurs a profit loss ∆௘ሺܥ, ܶሻ with 
probability (1θ) from its current market. Otherwise the ISV maintains its current position with 
probability θ. Therefore the expected profit of the ISV if it chooses not to join the platform is 
 ߨ௡ ൌ ߨ௘ െ ∆௘݌௡ሺ1 െ ߠሻ. (1)  
The ISV can also partner with the platform owner to tap into the customer base of the latter. Denote the 
additional profit the ISV enjoys from accessing the platform owner’s installed base by ߨ௦ሺܥ, ܲ, ܶሻ. We 
assume ߨ௦ is decreasing in the intensity of product market competition between the platform owner and 
the ISV (డగೞడ஼  ൏ 0), increasing in the platform’s penetration into the ISV’s target industries ( 
డగೞ
డ௉  ൐ 0), 
and an ISV with strong downstream capabilities is more successful in extracting additional profits from 
the platform owner’s installed base (డగೞడ் ൐ 0ሻ. By going through the product certification process, an ISV 
may have to disclose product design information to the platform owner. Therefore the platform owner has 
a higher probability, ݌௬ ൐  ݌௡, of successfully imitating the innovation. Similarly the ISV has a 
probability θ of successfully enforcing its IPR in this case. In addition, if the platform owner imitates the 
innovation and the ISV is unsuccessful in defending its IPR, the ISV suffers a profit loss from both the 
platform owner’s installed base ∆௦ሺܥ, ܶሻ and its own market ∆௘ሺܥ, ܶሻ. We assume the ISV’s losses from 
both its own market and the platform owner’s installed base are decreasing in the strength of the ISV’s 
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downstream complementary capabilities, while they are increasing in the intensity of product market 
competition between the platform owner and the ISV. That is, డ∆೐డ் ൏ 0,
డ∆ೞ
డ் ൏ 0,
డ∆೐
డ஼ ൐ 0,
డ∆ೞ
డ஼ ൐ 0. The 
expected profit of the ISV by joining the platform is  
 ߨ௬ ൌ ߨ௘ ൅ ߨ௦ െ ሺ∆௘ ൅ ∆௦ሻ݌௬ሺ1 െ ߠሻ. (2)  
The ISV chooses to partner as long as ߨ௬ െ ߨ௡ ൐ 0. Let the relative benefit of joining the platform 
ecosystem be 
 ܵ ൌ ߨ௬ െ ߨ௡ ൌ ߨ௦ െ ∆௘ሺ݌௬ െ ݌௡ሻሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ∆௦݌௬ሺ1 െ ߠሻ. (3)  
 
Figure A1: The ISV’s Payoffs 
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Taking partial derivatives of S with respect to the ISV’s IPR strength, downstream complementary 
capabilities, their interactions, the platform’s penetration into the ISV’s target industries, and intensity of 
product market competition between the ISV and the platform owner, it is straightforward to see that 
 ߲߲ܵߠ ൌ ∆௘ሺ݌
௬ െ ݌௡ሻ ൅ ∆௦݌௬ ൐ 0 (4)  
 
߲ܵ
߲ܶ ൌ
߲ߨ௦
߲ܶ െ
߲∆௘
߲ܶ ሺ݌
௬ െ ݌௡ሻሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ߲∆௦߲ܶ ݌
௬ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൐ 0 (5)  
 ߲ଶ߲ܵߠ߲ܶ ൌ
߲∆௘
߲ܶ ሺ݌
௬ െ ݌௡ሻ ൅ ߲∆௦߲ܶ ݌
௬ ൏ 0 (6)  
 
߲ܵ
߲ܲ ൌ
߲ߨ௦
߲ܲ ൐ 0 (7)  
 ߲߲ܵܥ ൌ
߲ߨ௦
߲ܥ െ
߲∆௘
߲ܥ ሺ݌
௬ െ ݌௡ሻሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ߲∆௦߲ܥ ݌
௬ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൏ 0 (8)  
(4) – (8) correspond to the five hypotheses H1 – H5, respectively, that we proposed in the main text.  
Further, it is straightforward to show that these results continue to hold or are strengthened if downstream 
complementary capabilities or intensity of product market competition between the ISV and the platform 
owner also affect the probability that the platform owner imitates the ISV’s innovation by assuming  
డ௣೤
డ் ൑
డ௣೙
డ் ൑ 0,  
డ௣೤
డ஼ ൒
డ௣೙
డ஼ ൒ 0. Essentially, these assumptions state that: the additional risk of imitation 
ሺ݌௬ െ ݌௡ሻ due to partnering is (1) non-increasing in ܶ, and (2) non-decreasing in ܥ. Specifically, we have  
 
߲ܵ
߲ܶ ൌ
߲ߨ௦
߲ܶ െ
߲∆௘
߲ܶ ሺ݌
௬ െ ݌௡ሻሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ߲∆௦߲ܶ ݌
௬ሺ1 െ ߠሻ 
െ ∆௘ ቆ߲݌
௬
߲ܶ െ
߲݌௡
߲ܶ ቇ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ∆௦
߲݌௬
߲ܶ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൐ 0 
          (5’) 
 
߲ଶܵ
߲ߠ߲ܶ ൌ
߲∆௘
߲ܶ ሺ݌
௬ െ ݌௡ሻ ൅ ߲∆௦߲ܶ ݌
௬ ൅ ∆௘ ቆ߲݌
௬
߲ܶ െ
߲݌௡
߲ܶ ቇ ൅ ∆௦
߲݌௬
߲ܶ ൏ 0                    (6’) 
 
߲ܵ
߲ܥ ൌ
߲ߨ௦
߲ܥ െ
߲∆௘
߲ܥ ሺ݌
௬ െ ݌௡ሻሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ߲∆௦߲ܥ ݌
௬ሺ1 െ ߠሻ 
െ ∆௘ ቆ߲݌
௬
߲ܥ െ
߲݌௡
߲ܥ ቇ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ∆௦
߲݌௬
߲ܥ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ. 
 
                   (8’) 
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Appendix B. Data Appendix 
B.1. Identifying the Sample 
To construct a representative sample of ISVs that are likely to form partnerships with SAP, we compare 
the product characteristics between existing SAP partners and those in the CorpTech data set. The first 
step involves retrieving a complete list of SAP’s current software partners. SAP publishes the directory of 
all its certified partners as well as their solution offerings on its Internet portal,8 and a search using the 
terms “Country: United States” and “Partner Category: Independent Software Vendor” yields a list of 
411 software firms that are existing SAP partners. Comparing this list with the CorpTech directory 
generates 206 matching records. One of the key advantages of the CorpTech database is that it records the 
product portfolio of each company and classifies the products using a product classification system.9 We 
retrieve the distinct 2-digit level product classification codes of the 206 existing SAP software partners, 
and identify the most frequent software product codes in the product portfolio of the partnering firms. 
Two product codes, SOF-MA (manufacturing software, 61 firms) and SOF-WD 
(warehousing/distribution software, 44 firms), emerge as the leading products that partnering firms 
produce. We subsequently define our sample as firms that operate in the United States, with primary 
industry of computer software (identified by CorpTech’s company primary industry code “SOF”), and 
that have ever produced SOF-MA or SOF-WD products during the sampling period. The query generates 
2175 ISVs from the CorpTech database. 
B.2. Identifying Partnerships 
We use the search term “COMPANY(SAP) and COMPANY(XYZ) and BODY(certification or certify or 
certified or partner or partnership or alliance)” to search against the Lexis/Nexis news wire services 
database to identify partnerships, where “XYZ” is replaced by the ISV’s name. For a random sample (60 
firms) of the 411 existing SAP partners, we are able to find a matching news release for over 98% of the 
firms, which confirms the validity of using press releases to determine the formation of alliances. We 
subsequently apply the same algorithm to our sample universe and retrieve 148 alliance events between 
sample ISVs and SAP. It is notable that there has been no such alliance activity prior to 1996. We further 
exclude pure joint development, marketing or distribution alliances and alliances after 2005 from the list. 
In addition, for ISVs that have multiple SAP alliance press releases (due to certification for multiple 
products, new versions of same product, or different interface certifications), we use the first such event 
as the time the ISV joins SAP’s platform ecosystem. 
                                                     
8 http://www.sap.com/ecosystem/customers/directories/searchpartner.epx 
9 CorpTech uses a proprietary, 3-digit level product classification system. For example, a product coded as “AUT-
AT-DA” means “factory automation”-“automatic test equipment”-“analog/digital component”. 
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B.3. Identifying Trademarks 
For each trademark listed on the USPTO database, a Live/Dead indicator is assigned, which could be 
Registered, Pending or Dead. Dead marks may have been abandoned, cancelled, or may have expired. 
Application abandonment usually happens as a result of failure to respond to an Office Action or a Notice 
of Allowance. Canceled trademarks are due to the registrant's failure to file the required continued use 
affidavit under Section 8 of the Trademark Act. An expired trademark results from the registrant’s failure 
to renew the trademark registration at the end of the registration period. To construct the trademark 
variable, we first retrieve all the trademark records for the sample ISVs, including pending and dead 
records. The next step involves devising a search term to be applied to the “goods and services” 
description of trademark records to retain only the software trademarks.10 Afterwards, we determine the 
life span of each trademark to derive the active trademarks for each firm-year. Pending and abandoned 
trademarks are removed as a formal trademark registration is never granted. For canceled trademarks, 
registration date and cancelation date are used to determine the life span. For expired trademarks, we 
calculate the expiration date as 10 years after the registration date, or 10 years after the latest renewal date 
if there has been any renewal record for the trademark. 
B.4. Measuring the Penetration Rate for Industries Served by the ISV 
We compute the penetration rates for industries in the SAP “master code” industry classification system, 
which is composed of indicators for 33 vertical industries (e.g., aerospace & defense, banking, and 
chemical, to name a few). We match the SAP master codes with the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes provided for each firm in the CI database (the match table is available from the authors upon 
request). We calculate the employee-weighted penetration rate in the CI universe of firms for each master 
code-year as a measure of the size of SAP’s network. Next, we read the target industries description of 
our ISVs and create master code dummies for each of them (CorpTech has a field that describes the 
industries that a firm sells its product and service to). Variable target industry penetration is defined as 
the average of SAP penetration rate across all the industries that a particular ISV serves. However, for a 
small portion of the ISVs, the CorpTech database does not give an explicit target industry description, but 
rather describe the firm as “selling products and services to multiple industries”. In that case, we use the 
average SAP penetration rate across all 33 industries to compute the penetration variable. We also create 
an indicator variable multiple industry to control for potential bias introduced by this coding. The variable 
is set to 1 if a firm’s precise target industry is not given in CorpTech. 
                                                     
10 After thorough content analysis of 100 software trademarks, we construct the key words as: “computer application” or 
“computer software” or “computer program” or “operating software” or “business application” or “software application” or 
“application software” or “enterprise system” or “accounting system” or “application program”. 
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